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THE WASHINGTON STATE TAX STRUCTURE
AS VIEWED BY THE CONSUMER
PHILLIP W. CARTWRIGHT*
In evaluating the Washington tax structure from the view point of
the consumer it is necessary to determine what is meant by "the
consumer." For purposes of this discussion, the term consumer de-
scribes a member of the general public performing in his role as a
householder rather than in his role as an employee, employer, or self-
employed individual. In his role as a consumer, the individual has a
certain set of criteria with which he can render a judgment in respect
to his satisfaction with a tax structure. Cast in another role, this same
individual may well have another set of criteria with which to judge
a tax structure.
Our first problem, therefore, is to establish appropriate criteria to
determine the efficacy of the system of state and local taxes as viewed
by the consumer. In economic terms we would say that we wish to
know what consumer welfare is with respect to the imposition of taxes.
Once these criteria have been established, they will be used to evaluate
the existing taxes in Washington.
The typical householder in all probability is neither well informed
about the present tax structure nor its alternatives. However, for our
discussion we shall assume a hypothetical consumer who: (1) is
knowledgeable of the existing tax system and alternative systems, (2)
has a welfare function typical of the majority of householders, (3) is
rational in the sense that he wishes to maximize his consumer welfare,
and (4) is capable of analyzing which tax or system of taxes most
nearly maximizes his consumer welfare.
One might argue that the tax system preferred by our hypothetical
consumer would be one of no taxes, and there may be such individuals,
but they would not be typical. Virtually all householders, whatever
their political label, desire that state and local governments provide
certain services or affect certain kinds of income transfers. State and
local governments do not have sufficient credit available to provide
these services and transfers without the collection of tax revenues or
related levies. The rational consumer who desires governmental serv-
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ices must regard his tax obligations as the means by which he pays
for the services he seeks. The consumer's view of the tax system cannot
be divorced from his demands for governmental services. One way of
looking at our central problem, therefore, is to determine whether the
consumer feels he is "getting his money's worth" for, his tax dollar.
THE BENEFIT AND ABILITY TO PAY PRINCIPLES
The most important criterion of consumer welfare is probably that
embodied in the benefit principle of taxation. This criterion dictates
that taxes be imposed as nearly as possible in proportion to benefits
received from the government. This criterion needs to be modified by
the desire of consumers to redistribute income and it is in this con-
nection that the ability to pay principle of taxation obtains.
In a general way most consumers probably regard their total tax
obligations to state and local taxing jurisdictions as excessive relative
to the services they feel they receive. There always appears to be a
strong predilection on the part of all types of taxpayers, including
consumers, to complain about the high cost of government as measured
by tax obligations, much in the same way that consumers customarily
complain about the "high cost of living."
Consumer Dissatisfaction. Complaints about the general level of
of taxation may result from two factors. First, since the consumer
does not contract for each of the governmental services he receives,
as he does for an automobile, a medical examination, or a loaf of
bread, he may not be aware of just what or how much he is purchasing
with his taxes. Second, for most governmental services the consumer
has no convenient yardstick by which he can measure value received.
In the private market of our economy, the consumer generally has
some alternative sources of supply from which to choose a commodity
or service and he can compare the price charged by one supplier with
that charged by another for the same or related commodity to deter-
mine whether he has "gotten his money's worth." In the area of
governmentally produced commodities and services, such as police
protection, fire protection, highways, municipal utilities, and a host
of other areas of expenditure, the government is virtually the sole
supplier and occupies a monopoly position. Irrespective of whether
they are justified, consumers' suspicions of the prices charged by those
with monopoly power are as prevelant today as they were in the time
of Adam Smith.
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Whatever system of taxes is used for the purposes of paying for
governmental expenditures, consumers are always concerned over what
might be called efficiency in government. As long as a consumer,
through tax levies, is forced to give up his purchasing power or com-
mand over resources, he will demand that these resources be used by
government in an efficient manner. In the absence of competition and
a marketplace for the production and sale of governmental goods and
services, it is incumbent upon any unit of government to use its tax
revenues to produce goods and services desired by the majority of
its taxpayers as efficiently as possible.
By the very nature of most governmental goods and services, some
individual consumers will be dissatisfied because they are forced to
pay for these goods and services whether they desire them or not. For
example, suppose a dam is constructed to provide flood control for
residents living downstream. All of these residents will receive the
service of flood control. If all of the residents desire flood control and
each is willing to pay his proportion of the necessary costs, there
would be no reason why the service could and would not be provided
by the private sector of the economy. However, if only a majority
of the residents desire flood control and each is willing to pay this
same proportional share of the cost, does it not seem reasonable that
the service should be provided? The private sector will not provide
the service because there is no way for a private firm to exact from
the minority of residents, who do not desire the services, a price for
the services they inevitably receive. A government, however, through
its taxing power may exact from all of the residents who benefit, i.e.
receive flood control, the necessary costs and, therefore, can and should
provide the services desired by the majority. This is a commonly
accepted principle of democracy. It is, of course, incumbent upon
the government to determine that the total value of the benefits to
society equals or exceeds the costs of the project, and to see that the
costs of providing the service are minimized. It is not necessary that
the sum of the benefits to the majority, those consumers who would
vote in favor of government providing the service, exceed the costs
since these costs will be shared by the minority as well as those who
benefit, though unwillingly. This minority will always be dissatisfied
with any tax which exacts revenue to pay for unwanted services. We
wish to concern ourselves not with the views of consumers who would
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fall into such a minority but- rather with those who by majority rule
favor various types of government expenditures.
Not all government expenditures are of the flood control type, pro-
viding benefits to all members of a group or society indiscriminately.
Many expenditures provide services or benefits primarily to the users
of the service. For example, a bridge which reduces the travel time
between two locations is primarily of benefit to those who potentially
would travel between the locations, a recreation area is primarily of
benefit to those who would use it, etc. The tax system which is appro-
priate for the funding of one kind of expenditure may be different from
that appropriate to another. The criteria by which our hypothetical
consumer must judge the tax system can be developed only in the
context of the nature of governmental expenditures involved.
Types of Government Expenditures. Governmental expenditure
programs may be divided into three categories. First, there are those
whose benefits accrue to society generally although not necessarily
equally to each consumer in society. Expenditures to maintain law and
order, to protect property and civil rights, and to preserve and perpet-
uate democratic government itself are examples of this category. It
is virtually impossible to determine the relative benefits to each individ-
ual of these services so that funding of this category of expenditures
should come from a tax or system of taxes which is imposed upon all
households if consumer equity is to be served.
Second, there are those expenditure programs whose benefits accrue
primarily to those particular individuals who have sought these pro-
grams through the democratic process. Funding of these programs
should be accomplished by taxes, licenses, fees, etc., which assign the
costs to the beneficiaries. Only with such a tax system can we be
consistent with the primary criterion of consumer welfare, the benefit
principle.
The third category of expenditure programs are those designed to
redistribute real income in society. Social welfare programs which
provide income transfers to the aged, the blind, the indigent, the un-
employed, etc. are obvious examples. However, many other programs
are primarily of this character. The whole program of public institu-
tions is designed to provide care of one sort or another for people who
cannot afford care from the private market sector. Penal and correc-
tional institutions as well as mental institutions provide benefits to
society as well but they still involve income transfers. Funding of these
1965]
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expenditures should be accomplished by taxes which at least do not
defeat the redistributional aims and which may further the aims.
Ability to Pay. The concept that taxes should be based upon ability
to pay rather than simply benefits received is analogous to the belief
on the part of the majority of consumers that the distribution of income
among individuals in society resulting from private market forces is
not one which a majority would accept as equitable. It is not simply
a matter of the lower income groups using the taxing power of gov-
ernment through the democratic process to exact income from higher
income groups, although occasionally one sees legislation of this type.
Rather, it is suggested that the "Robin Hood" image is generally
accepted in our society. We do not believe that the unemployed or
the unemployable are themselves responsible for their income plight,
nor do we believe that they should not share in the total real income
of society. Most of us do not believe that the poor deserve to be poor,
nor for that matter that the rich deserve to be rich. One's position on
the income ladder is in part due to effort and perseverance but it is
also greatly affected by the magnitude of one's inheritance of material
wealth, innate capacities, education and training, and probably good
fortune. Because of these beliefs most consumers willingly support
programs which raise the level of income of the lower income classes.
Such transfers are really negative income taxes. It must be recognized
that these increases will come in part from transfers in the forms of
positive income taxes levied upon higher income groups, whatever the
particular kind of tax which is used to support these programs. If these
consumers are rational and consistent in their views they should sim-
ilarly support a tax structure which levies disproportionately larger
obligations on higher income and/or wealthier taxpayers.
While it is possible abstractly to categorize governmental programs
into the above threefold division, actual programs inevitably involve
a mixture of the three categories. For example, expenditures for
public education are one of the major and most costly of state and
local government programs. Obviously the individuals (and their fam-
ilies) who receive publicly supported education receive substantial
benefits. There is ample evidence to support the correlation between
the amount of education an individual receives and his future income.
The method of financing public education should perhaps reflect these
benefits. However, lower income groups could not possibly afford the
pro-rata cost of education even through secondary education, much
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less higher education, for their children. If these children are to
receive the amount of education which most states now require by
law, a transfer of income is necessary and such a transfer is effected
by the subsidization of education from general tax funds. Finally, it
is generally believed in our society that education of the youth provides
benefits to all members of society. Not only is an educated population
more productive, thus producing a larger total real income for society,
but the preservation of a free democratic society surely depends upon
a literate if not well educated population. For these reasons we feel
justified in taxing those who have no children and those who choose
to purchase private or parochial education for their children to pay
for public education.
The distribution of the benefits of education between those receiving
the education and the rest of society changes with the level of educa-
tion. The higher the level of education, the greater will be the share of
benefit to the recipient and the less to society generally. This is in
part reflected by our methods of financing higher education as com-
pared with common schools; but this alteration of method is probably
inadequate to completely conform to the benefit principle of taxation.
In our zeal for public education, our method of financing reflects our
tendency to underestimate the benefits of the recipients and overes-
timate the societal benefits, particularly for higher education. Nor
can these financing methods be justified on redistributional grounds.
Our subsidization of higher education from general tax funds provides
transfers of real income to the recipients and their families without
respect to their level of income. This is not to argue against the amount
of expenditure on education at any level, but rather upon the method
of financing these expenditures.
Since most governmental programs, like public education, involve
direct benefits to recipients, indirect benefits to society, and income
transfers, methods of financing should reflect this. No single tax is
likely to succeed in satisfying both the benefit principle and the ability
to pay principle. A system of taxes levied to support any particular
program should reflect the consumers' views of the relative importance
of these factors.
Equity and Neutrality. Before examining Washington's tax system,
two other criteria should be mentioned which are applicable to the
consumers' judgment of a tax. The first is what we might refer to as
equity among taxpayers in like circumstances. Once the tax base is
19651
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determined, whether that base is income, expenditures, or some form of
wealth, taxpayers with the same base should be required to pay the
same amount of tax.
The other criterion is one of neutrality of a tax with respect to the
allocation of resources among alternative productive uses, or the
allocation of income among alternative expenditures. The former is
a matter of economic efficiency in production, while the latter is con-
cerned with consumer sovereignty both of which are important tenets
of a free enterprise system. A particular tax may be used and its use
might be justified as a penalty tax to discourage production or con-
sumption of some good or service. A truly protective tariff or a prohib-
itive tax on narcotics would be an example of a penalty tax, and, of
course, is not neutral but interferes with efficient production or con-
sumer sovereignty. Justification requires that benefits to society result-
ing from the tax outweigh the benefits denied by the tax to particular
individuals. Actually, most forms of taxation violate the neutrality
criterion to some extent for it is in the nature of a forced levy that the
discretion of the taxpayer is restricted in some manner. In judging a
tax, one may hope simply to minimize the interference with economic
efficiency and consumer sovereignty.
ANALYSIS OF WASHINGTON TAXES
The revenue system of the governmental units in the State of
Washington consists of a large variety of different taxes, fees, and
licenses. The most important of these are the property tax, the general
retail sales tax, selective excise taxes, and the business and occupation
tax. We shall discuss the merits of these taxes and the often proposed
state income tax in terms of our criteria.
Property Tax. The property tax, used primarily for the financing of
local government expenditures including common schools, is consonant
to some degree with the benefit principle. To the extent that local gov-
ernment expenditures involve the maintenance of law and order and
the protection of property rights, the benefits to property owners will
vary with the amount of property, and the tax imposed against prop-
erty as a base is therefore a reasonable one for these purposes. There
are, however, certain shortcomings to this property tax. It is not a
general property tax but a real property tax. Other forms of individual
wealth or property typically are not subject to the tax with the minor
exception of certain types of personal property. It has proved admin-
[Voi 39
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istratively infeasible to tax most personal property or intangible prop-
erty. Thus, two individuals with the same total wealth and hence the
same benefits from these governmental expenditures may have different
proportions of real property in their portfolios, so that real property
is a somewhat imperfect index of benefits. An individual may evade
this tax obligation by changing the composition of his wealth.
The property tax is a major source of revenue for the financing of
schools.' For these expenditures the property tax is a very imperfect
index of benefits. There is little connection between a household's real
property value and the number of children of school age. Even if one
considers public education at this level to be of benefit to all members
of society there is still little relation between the individual consumer's
share of these benefits and his share of total taxable real property.
In terms of the ability to pay criterion, the property tax and the
expenditures it finances produce some redistribution of real income.
There is obviously some correlation between an individual's income
and the taxable value of his real property so that a tax imposed on
real property is similar to an income tax but again the relation be-
tween income and this particular form of wealth is far from perfect.
Nevertheless, if consumers believe in the ability to pay principle, the
property tax is a useful adjunct to other taxes (including an income
tax) in achieving conformity with this principle. This tax imposes a
levy against property which yields a real income to the owner-occupant
while other taxes ignore this income.
The property tax has its greatest shortcomings with respect to the
criterion of equity among taxpayers in equal circumstances. The rate
of taxation varies from one tax jurisdiction to another and the assessed
value of properties whose market value may be identical varies even
more.2 Even within a single tax jurisdiction the variation of assessed
valuations of properties of the same market value is great. Assuming
that the county assessors and their staffs are infallible in their appraisal
judgments of the values of property, the relative market values of
individual properties are continually changing and thus creating ineq-
uities. The assessor's office cannot administratively reappraise each
property each year, so that even under ideal appraisal conditions equity
among taxpayers is certain to be constantly violated.
1 WAsr. CONST. art. 7, § 2, amend. 17(1944) limits school districts to a maximum
levy of 10 mills unless an excess is approved by the voters.
2 The variation in actual ratio of assessment for 1963 ranges from 14.6% in San
Juan County to 25% in Grant County. WASHINGTON STATE RESEARCH COUNcM, THE
RESEARCH COuNCIL's HA DBOOK 584-85 (1964-65 ed.).
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Retail Sales Tax. The retail sales tax provides the largest amount
of revenue of any tax in the State of Washington.' In terms of the
benefit principle this tax bears little relationship to the distribution
of benefits of the expenditure programs it finances." However, it does
provide for tax levies against tourists or other non-residents who receive
the benefits of governmental expenditures and might not otherwise be
subject to tax. On the other hand, alternative forms of revenue collec-
tions might be used to compensate for these benefits.
On the basis of the ability to pay principle the retail sales tax bears
some relationship to individual income. In combination with the expen-
diture programs that it finances (education, welfare, public institu-
tions, etc.), it does provide for a redistribution of real income. However,
the tax liabilities resulting from this tax do not conform perfectly with
the distribution of income. The proportion of an individual's income
which is expended on those items which are subject to the retail sales
tax diminishes with rising income, and probably increases with the
size of the household unit.5 This means that, even though the tax rate
is four per cent on all taxable items, the tax obligation for a large, low-
income family is greater in proportion to its income than the tax obliga-
tion for a smaller, high-income family is in proportion to its income.
For consumers who feel strongly about redistribution of income and
the ability to pay criterion, the retail sales tax does not meet this crite-
rion as well as a tax levied on income or wealth which includes an
increasing tax rate with the level of income or wealth.
It has often been suggested that the retail sales tax could be made to
conform more closely to income if expenditures for certain classes of
goods, for example food, were exempted. While the proportion of which
expenditures other than food bear to income may be more nearly con-
stant, the relationship is not clearly predictable. On the other hand,
if the retail sales tax could be extended to cover the purchase of all
goods and services and the purchase of assets as well, the tax could
be made to resemble a flat rate income tax.6
With respect to equity among taxpayers the retail sales tax performs
very well. It is relatively easy to enforce and evasion and avoidance
are difficult.
3 For figures on the Washington Retail Sales Tax, see id. and TAx FOUNDATION,
INC., FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE (12th ed. 1963).
4 For a discussion of the programs financed by the retail sales tax, see Shipman,
Projected State Financial Needs, 39 WASH. L. RIv. 976 (1965).5 See RCW Ch. 82.08 for the application of the Washington Retail Sales Tax.6Ibid.
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With respect to the criterion of neutrality in affecting the allocation
of resources or consumer expenditures the retail sales tax does little
violence. The only problem arises in border areas adjoining states
without such a tax. Here, the affect of the tax is to divert otherwise
taxable expenditures to retail establishments across the border. The
misallocation of resources in this connection is probably not significant.
Excise Taxes. Among the selective excise taxes, the taxes yielding
the greatest amount of revenue are those levied upon gasoline, motor
vehicles, liquor, cigarettes, and other tobacco products.7 Most selective
excise taxes violate the neutrality criterion with respect to consumer
choice. The effect of the tax is to raise the price of the goods or serv-
ices, and discourage its consumption relative to other goods. Unless
it is the intention of the tax to penalize consumers who wish to consume
the taxed article, such taxes cannot be justified on consumer welfare
grounds. Two exceptions, however, should be noted. If it can be shown
that the items taxed are purchased by consumers in amounts which
increase with income, the taxes could be justified on the ability to pay
principle. Such examples are thought of as luxury taxes. The difficulty
with these taxes is in finding items which are a part of all consumers'
expenditure patterns and in amounts which increase with income. The
taxes on liquor and tobacco clearly do not meet this test.
The other important exception of selective excises which do not
violate our criteria are those which are directly related to a program of
benefits to particular individuals. Thus, taxes upon gasoline or motor
vehicles are clearly justified on the benefit principle. The benefits to
consumers of highways are obvious. The use of the highways is closely
related to motor vehicles and the consumption of gasoline. The revenue
from such special excises must, of course, be used for the program
which provide the benefits to which they are related.' This same jus-
tification can be made for tolls or fees for the use of bridges or ferries,
public recreation areas, licenses for hunting and fishing to support state
game programs, payroll taxes to support unemployment or workmen's
compensation benefits, or for tuition charges to institutions of higher
education. From the standpoint of consumer welfare the tax system
7At the present time the excise taxes on the following items are: gasoline (7!2
cents per gallon) ; cigarettes (7 cents per package; motor vehicles (2% of fair market
value) ; house trailers (1% of fair market value); aircraft (1% of fair market value).8 Washington, by constitutional amendment, is required to pay revenue from motor
vehicle license fees and excise taxes from motor vehicle fuel into the highway fund
which is used exclusively for highway purposes. WASH. CONsT. art. 2, § 40, amend.
18(1944).
19651
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
makes too little use of the selective levy to support a selective benefit
program.
Business and Occupation Tax. The business and occupation tax
which collects a significant amount of revenue is perhaps the most
maligned tax in the system, but the objections to it are largely from
businesses rather than consumers. The small, self-employed busi-
nessman may confuse his interests as a business owner with his interests
as a consumer since they are so closely interrelated but we are con-
cerned here only with the consumer. This tax is essentially like a
general sales tax levied at all levels of production instead of at retail
only and the base of the tax is gross sales rather than net income.
It is this feature which leads to complaints. Since the ratio of net in-
come to gross sales is vastly different for different types of businesses,
the tax cannot be said to conform to the ability to pay criterion. Appar-
ently those businessmen who complain about the business and occupa-
tion tax are consciously or unconsciously strongly committed to the
ability to pay criterion. Complaints typically arise in those industries
which have a small net income relative to gross sales and thus must
pay a larger tax in proportion to net income than others.
From the consumer's viewpoint, the business and occupation tax is
no better or worse than a general sales tax except that the tax rates
are not entirely uniform. Where the rate of tax varies for particular
industries this tax takes on the undesirable characteristics of selective
sales taxes. Such variation in rates might be justified on the basis of
our criteria if the variation in rates caused the tax to conform more
closely to net income and thus to the ability to pay principle.
Charges are frequently made that the business and occupation tax
discourages the location of new industries or the expansion of existing
industries. If this were true, it would be of some concern to consumer
welfare. However, any level of taxation on a particular business which
exceeds the level which would be imposed by the tax jurisdiction of
some alternative site may discourage expansion or location. Taxes,
however, are only one factor determining location or expansion and
rarely are they the critical factor.9 Moreover, while the business and
occupation tax may discourage one type of business, any alternative
tax on business which would collect the same amount of state revenue
tax (including property or net income taxes) may discourage some
9 See Strawn, The Washington State Tax Structure as Viewed by Business, 39
WAsH. L. RFv. 1013 (1965).
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other type of business. It is not at all clear, therefore, that the business
and occupation tax is better or worse than alternative business taxes
from the viewpoint of consumers.
Proposed Income Tax. As the costs of existing programs continue
to rise faster than the tax revenues from the present system of taxes
and as demands from the public for new programs continue, the state
government will have to consider additional forms of taxation. Among
those considered will be a personal income tax. Although this form
of taxation has been proposed on several occasions by the legislature,
judicial interpretation of the Washington Constitution has prevented
the enactment of a net income tax without constitutional amendment.1"
We are not concerned here with estimating the public's willingness to
vote for any new additional tax measure but rather whether such a
tax as an alternative to the present taxes better satisfies the criteria of
consumer welfare.
An income tax bears little or no relationship to the benefit principle.
With respect to the ability to pay principle, a net income tax on persons
conforms more closely than most other taxes and if the rate structure
is progressive, i.e., rises with income, this tax can redistribute income
more effectively than almost any other tax.
With respect to the criterion of equity among taxpayers in equal
circumstances, the net income tax has many shortcomings. The diffi-
culty of defining net income, of preventing avoidance, especially at
higher income levels through a host of loopholes, and the problems of
enforcement are well known in connection with the federal income tax.
The progressivity of the federal income tax is much less than might be
supposed by the rate structure. More serious, however, is the fact
that two individuals with the same real income may have quite different
tax obligations.
CONCLUSION
In summary we have attempted to evaluate the most important forms
of taxation in the State of Washington in terms of criteria which we
believe relevant to the consumer's interests. No tax or system of taxes
is likely to satisfy all of the criteria simultaneously since the criteria
themselves are to some extent mutually conflicting in their objectives.
10 See Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933) (holding that a net
income tax is a tax on property and invalid under W,sn. CoNsT., amend. 14) and
Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607(1936). See also Comment, A Study
of State Income Taxation in Washington, 33 WAsH. L. REv. 398 (1958).
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Some consumers will value the ability to pay criterion more than the
benefit criterion and thus find the system which is one kind of com-
promise lacking; while others believing more strongly in the benefit
principle will also be dissatisfied. A more adequate system of taxes
could be achieved in the view of our hypothetical consumer if: (1)
more attention were given to levies upon specific beneficiaries where
programs provide specific benefits; (2) more efforts were made to im-
prove the operation of the property tax and perhaps other taxes to
prevent inequity between taxpayers; (3) discriminatory excises unre-
lated to benefit programs were eliminated; (4) a net income tax were
substituted in part for the general sales taxes in order to make the
whole system conform more closely to the ability to pay principle.
